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Thailand
Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
(2005)
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Note concerning Thailand Supreme court opinions: Thailand is a civil law jurisdiction that also has elements of the common law system. Accordingly, the principle law sources are acts, statutes and regulations. However, published Supreme court decisions are an important part of the legal development of Thailand and are frequently used as a secondary authority. (Summaries sponsored by Chaninat & Leeds) |
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Supreme
Court Opinion No. 247/2548
Napor v. Thong-yoy
Re:
Gambling Loans
The
plaintiff, the defendant and their associates “play shares”
(a type of gambling where the players wager money on shares) with
the plaintiff as host. According to the agreement between the host
and the players, after a player bids upon a share, he or she must
sign a loan for the wagered sum of money. The defendant wagered
82,800 baht which she borrowed from the plaintiff. The loan agreement
is not forged and the defendant is liable for performance of truth
to the plaintiff according to the loan agreement. |
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Supreme
Court Opinion No. 1456/2548
Pimpru v. Peingkok-krawd
Re:
Land, Possessory Right
An
area of the Thailand land given to the defendant by the plaintiff is disputed.
In order to settle the dispute, the Supreme Court must determine
how much land was given to the defendant by the plaintiff in order
to determine if the estate in dispute is the Thailand property of the plaintiff
or of the five defendants. If it appears that the plaintiff never
gave an estate to the first defendant, then the estate belongs to
the plaintiff. Thus the Court must reconsider to whom the land belongs.
A letter bestowing the estate upon the defendant written by the
plaintiff and Nor. Sor. 3 specify that the plaintiff and Por. gave
an estate of 3 Ngan 16 m 2 to the defendant, in accordance with
Nor. Sor.3. When the first defendant took possession of the estate,
the plaintiff never objected. When the first defendant had a land
officer survey the land for a title deed, the plaintiff acknowledged
the boundary line in his capacity as the owner of the adjoining
land, although he was unaware of the exact area of the defendant's
estate. According to the plaintiff's recorded testimony, the plaintiff
agreed that the land survey was correct and there was no encroachment
on the plaintiff's Thailand leased property. Therefore the first defendant's ownership
of the estate was acknowledged by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's
acknowledgement of the land deed is of greater importance than either
the letter or Nor. Sor. 3. The 1 Rai 99 m 2 area registered on the
title deed is therefore the area of the defendant's estate rather
than the 3 Ngan 60 m 2 area specified in the letter of bestowal
and Nor. Sor. 3. |
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Supreme
Court Opinion No. 1602/2548
Wattanatum v. Leetrakoolwalna
Re:
Declaration of Intention, Hire of Property
The
plaintiff inherited the building in dispute from Por. A contract
of hire made between Por., as the landlord, and the defendant,
as the lessee, will expire after 15 years. Clause 11 of the contract
of hire specifies that the landlord will renew the contract of
hire every 3 years after the initial period of hire expires. This
specification is only a promise from Por. and does not make the
contract of hire come into existence. The promise does not have
a binding effect upon Por. because it does not appear that the
defendant declared his intention to accept Por.'s offer before
Por's death. The defendant acknowledged that Por. died on July
15 th B.E. 2537 before the contract of hire expired on December
31 B.E. 2538. According to Section 360 of The Civil and Commercial
Code, the provision of Section 169 paragraph 2 does not apply
to this case. On the ground that the promise of Por. is not a
legal contract, it does not have a binding effect upon the plaintiff.
The plaintiff does not need to comply with the provisions of Section
1599 and Section 1600. Because the letter of renewal of the contract
of hire is ineffective and does not make a new contract of hire
come into existence, the plaintiff is able to sue for the eviction
of the defendant and the dependents of the defendant from the
disputed building. After the expiration of the contract of hire,
the defendant and his dependents had no right to live in the disputed
building. Due to the fact that the defendant and his dependents
occupy the building unlawfully, they are liable for eviction and
their actions that disabled the plaintiff from gaining interest
from the building in dispute.
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Supreme
Court Opinion No. 593
Kritpol v. Lertsongkram
Re:
Joint Liability of Employers
The
first defendant, an employee of the second defendant, hit the first
plaintiff's taxi causing her injury while working for the first
second defendant. The first plaintiff's taxi was driven by the second
plaintiff. The second plaintiff no longer has a case because although
the Supreme Court found only the first defendant negligent, the
Appeals Court ruled the second plaintiff was also negligent. However,
the judgment of the Supreme Court will prevail and both defendants
have to make compensation to the plaintiffs. |
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Supreme
Court Opinion No. 360
Government Savings Bank v. Ruksil
Re:
Prescription and Labor
The
plaintiff sued the second defendant for defecting on his duty and
causing damage while working for the plaintiff. He is asking the
first defendant for compensation. This plaintiff is accusing the
defendant of committing a wrongful act while working and therefore
breaching a labor agreement. In this case, there is no specified
period of prescription, thus the period is ten years. |
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Supreme
Court Opinion No. 1756/2548
Rattanabadin Company Limited v. Maochai
Re:
Contract of Compromise
A
contract of compromise is a contract by which parties settle a dispute
through mutual concessions. The first defendant delegated the third
defendant, a party not liable to the plaintiff, to meet the plaintiff's
attorney without an appointment. The third defendant acted independently
when he arranged a contract of compromise between the first defendant
and the plaintiff through which the first defendant will pay an
outstanding debt to the plaintiff in installments. The third defendant's
intentional and independent actions make him jointly liable with
the first defendant. A clause in the above contract specifies that
the plaintiffs did not waive their claims to liability from the
first and the second defendant. The contract clearly specifies that
it is not intended to fulfill the first and second defendant's arrears.
Although the contract is called the contract of compromise, it is
not a legally recognizable contract of compromise. It is a contract
made by the third defendant who by this action became jointly liable.
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Supreme
Court No. 886 /2548
Scandinavialeasing Public Limited v. Sahapybulkij
Re:
Designation of authorization
Jor.
and Kor. are employees of I, S. Company. Wor. is the Thailand company director.
Wor., the plaintiff, sued Jor. and Kor., the defendants, for acting
without authorization on behalf of the company. Jor. and Kor. claim
that they acted with authorization and therefore the plaintiff does
not have the right to sue. The plaintiff's Power of Attorney contains
the following statements; "Sor. and Wor., the authorized directors
of I,S. Company have designated Wor. to be the solely authorized
company agent with the power to affix his signature together with
the stamp and the official seal and/or to act on company's behalf
as follows:. Clause 1. The authorized person is empowered to sue..
Clause 9. ..authorized to designate a sub-agent vested with the
power to take any of the above actions." A second POA contains statements
such as, "Wor, the authorized director of I,S. company, designates
Jor. and/or Kor. to be company agents empowered to act on the behalf
of the company as follows; ." The final POA specified that Wor.
is the appointee authorized to act as the company director. Section
10 of the Civil and Commercial Code states, "When a clause in a
document can be interpreted in two ways, weight will be given to
the interpretation that allows for stricter implementation". Therefore,
the POA and the plaintiff's deed of appointment, specify the plaintiff
as the person authorized to act for the company. Jor. and Kor. are
sub-agents who can carry out entrusted duties but cannot act as
the authorized director of a company. Therefore, the plaintiff is
empowered to sue. |
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