*
LL.B. (Chulalongkorn University), LL.M. (Chulalongkorn University),
B.Econ. (Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University), LL.M. (University
of Washington); Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University;
Email addresses: kanaphon.c@chula.ac.th and kanaphon@u.washington.edu.
1) Panel Report, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar,
WT/DS265/R, WT/DS266/R, and WT/DS283/R (Oct. 15, 2004); Appellate Body
Report, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/R,
WT/DS266/R, and WT/DS283/AB/R (Apr. 28, 2005).
2) In addition to the complaining and responding parties, many countries
requested to be the third parties. These countries consisted of: (1)
Barbados; (2) Belize; (3) Canada; (4) China; (5) Colombia; (6) Côte
d’Ivoire; (7) Cuba; (8) Fiji; (9) Guyana; (10) India; (11) Jamaica;
(12) Kenya; (13) Madagascar; (14) Malawi; (15) Mauritius; (16) New Zealand;
(17) Paraguay; (18) St. Kitts & Nevis; (19) Swaziland; (20) Tanzania;
(21) Trinidad & Tobago; and (22) the U.S.
3) See Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/aust.dpf (last visited Apr. 27, 2006).
4) The author calculated from data provided by the Ministry of Commerce,
Thailand.
5) Department of Trade Negotiations, Suing against the
EC before the WTO in Export Subsidies on Sugar 4 (Oct. 2005) (unpublished
fact sheet, on file with Department of Trade Negotiations, Ministry
of Commerce, Thailand).
6) See FTA Watch Group, http://www.ftawatch.org/cgi-bin/content/news/show.pl?1176
(last visited Apr. 27, 2006).
7) Office of Cane and Sugar Board, Quantity and Value
of Exported Sugar 1997-2005 1 (2005) (unpublished fact sheet, on file
with Office of Cane and Sugar Board, Thailand).
8) In 1992 the European Economic Community (EEC or EC)
was replaced by the European Union (EU). This study will use the abbreviation
“EC” to represent this customs union.
9) The Cairns Group is a coalition of agricultural exporting
countries, including both developed countries (Australia, New Zealand
and Canada) and developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chili, Fiji,
Hungary, Indonesia, Colombia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and
Uruguay). See http://www.cairnsgroup.org (last visited Apr. 27, 2006).
10) William J. Davey, The Rules for Agricultural Trade
in GATT, in GATT AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE 3-4 (Masayoshi
Honma, Akiko Shimizu & Hideki Funatu eds., 1993).
11) In 1944, a conference dealing with the establishment
of the International Trade Organization (ITO) took place at Bretton
Woods in New Hampshire in order to create a liberal system of world
trade after the Second World War. for re-approval; consequently, this
organization was not officially established.
Unfortunately, since the rules in the ITO Charter required not merely
free trade, the Charter was not sent to the U.S. Congress During drafting
the ITO Charter, however, the twenty-two nations of drafters reached
a tentative agreement entitled the “General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade” (“GATT”) in order to reduce tariffs among
them before the ITO was set up. After the U.S. refusal of the ITO Charter,
this agreement became active to play a crucial role of lowering tariff
barrier among its members (“CONTRACTING PARTIES”), generating
schedules identifying customs treatment. See BO SÖDERSTEN &
GEOFFREY REED, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 350 (1994); Craig A. A. Dixon,
Environmental Survey of WTO Dispute Resolution Panel Decisions since
1995: Trade at all Costs?, 24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 79-80, 90 (2000); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND
THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 22 (2000); and
PETER-TOBIAS STOLL & FRANK SCHORKOPF, WTO: WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER,
WORLD ECONOMIC LAW 12 (2006).
12) See HAVANA CHARTER, arts. 25-28 & ch. VI.
13) DALE E. HATHAWAY, AGRICULTURE AND THE GATT: REWRITING
THE RULES 103-104 (1987).
14) Id. at 104.
15) GATT 1947 art. XVI:3.
16) Davey, supra note 10, at 5.
17) The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was created
by the Treaty of Rome, operating its work according to its objectives
under Article 39 of this Treaty. Two objectives concerning subsidies
were: (1) to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community,
in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged
in agriculture; and (2) to stabilize markets.
18) HATHAWAY, supra note 13, at 106.
19)Miguel Montana-Mora, International Law and International
Relations Cheek to Cheek: An International Law/International Relation
Perspective on the U.S./EC Agricultural Export Subsidies Dispute, 19
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 11 n. 48 (1993-1994).
20) Between 1957 and 1982, seven cases which the EC
was the respondent included eggs (one in 1957), flour (two in 1958 and
1981), barley (one in 1977), sugar (two in 1979 and 1980) and pasta
(one in 1982).
21) JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 393-95
(1969).
22) AGREEMENT ON INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
ARTICLE VI, XVI, AND XXII OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
art. 10(2)(a).
23) Jon G. Filipek, Agriculture in a World of Comparative
Advantage: The Prospects for Farm Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay
Round of GATT Negotiations 30 HARV. INT’L L. J. 123, 146 (1989).
24) MARCH BENITAH, THE LAW OF SUBSIDIES UNDER THE GATT/WTO
SYSTEM 174 (2001).
25) See Report of the Panel, EC – Refunds on
Exports of Sugar, L/4833 (1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) (1980).
26) See Report of the Panel, EC – Refunds on
Exports of Sugar, L/5011 (1980), GATT B.I.S.D. (27th Supp.) (1981).
27) Miguel Antonio Figueroa, The GATT and Agriculture:
Past, Present, and Future 5 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 93, 96
(1995-1996).
28) Filipek, supra note 23, at 148.
29) Figueroa, supra note 27, at 96.
30) Kevin C. Kennedy, International Trade in Agriculture:
Where We’ve Been, Where We Are, and Where’re Headed 10 MSU-DCL
J. INT’L L. 1, 2-3 (2001).
31) The Agreement on Agriculture is one of the key
Agreements within the WTO system. This Agreement contains 21 Articles
plus 5 Annexes, consisting of three main issues: (1) market access;
(2) domestic subsidies; and (3) export subsidies.
32) Article 3 of the SCM Agreement provides:
3.1 Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following
subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1, shall be prohibited:
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one
of several other conditions, upon export performance, including those
illustrated in Annex I;
(b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other
conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods.
3.2 A Member shall neither grant nor maintain subsidies referred to
in paragraph 1.
33) AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE (AOA) pmbl.
34) Id.
35) (1) Export subsidies subject to product-specific
reduction commitments within the restrictions specified in the relevant
schedules of WTO Members; (2) any excess of budgetary outlays for export
subsidies or subsidized export quantity greater than the limits specified
in the schedules covered by the “downstream flexibility”
provision of Article 9.2 (b); (3) export subsidies consistent with the
special and differential treatment provision for developing country
Members according to Article 9.4; and (4) export subsidies other than
those subject to reduction commitments given that they conform with
the anti-circumvention disciplines provided in Article 10. See WTO,
WTO AGREEMENTS SERIES: AGRICULTURE, 16-19 (2000).
36) Taking average for 1986-1990 as the base level,
developed countries agreed to reduce the value of export subsidies by
36% over the six years starting in 1995 and by 24% within 10 years for
developing countries. For quantity, developed countries committed to
cut export subsidies by 21% over 6 years and by 14% within 10 years
for developing countries. However, such commitments do not bind least-developed
countries. See WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm
(last visited Apr. 27, 2006).
37) AOA art. 3.3.
38) Id. art. 8.
39) Id. art. 9.1(c).
40) See Robert E. Hudec, Does the Agreement on Agriculture
Work? Agricultural Dispute after the Uruguay Round 4-47 (Int’l
Agric. Trade Research Consortium, Working paper No. 98-2, 1998); Stefan
Tangermann, Agriculture on the Way to Firm International Trading Rules,
in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR
OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 270-81 (Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick
eds., 2002); Warren Males, Building Alliances for Liberalization and
Reform of Sugar Policies Globally, in SUGAR AND RELATED SWEETENER MARKETS:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 351-52 (Andrew Schmitz et al. eds., 2002);
and Bernard Hoekman & Patrick Messerlin, Removing the Exception
of Agricultural Export Subsidies, in AGRICULTURAL TRADE REFORM &
THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 195-219 (Kym Anderson & Will Martin
eds., 2006).
41) See USDA, http://www.ers.usda.gov/db/wto (last
visited Apr. 27, 2006).
42) WTO, INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 116 (2005).
43) Apichart Pongsrihadulchai, Application of Information
Technology in Agriculture in Thailand, in AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
IN ASIA AND OCEANIA 1998, 19 (1998).
44) See app.
45) 2 SUKHOTHAI THAMMATHIRAT OPEN UNIVERSITY, THAI
ECONOMY 10 (2nd ed., 2001).
46) Department of Trade Negotiations, http://www.dtn.moc.go.th
(last visited Apr. 27, 2006).
47) This was an agreement between Siam (Thailand) and
Britain which achieved commercial and political aims that earlier British
missions had failed to gain and opened up Siam to Western influence
and trade. The treaty set a 3 percent duty on all imports. See Encyclopædia
Britannica Online, http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9016040 (last
visited Apr. 27, 2006).
48) The U.S., France, Denmark, Portugal, Holland, Germany,
Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Japan
49) 1 SUKHOTHAI THAMMATHIRAT OPEN UNIVERSITY, THAI
ECONOMY 147-48 (2nd ed., 2001).
50) DORYANE KERMEL-TORRÈS, ATLAS OF THAILAND:
SPATIAL STRUCTURES AND DEVELOPMENT 94 (2004).
51) Department of Trade Negotiations, supra note 5,
at 4.
CHAWEEWAN KLAIYA, ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN THE WORLD STRUCTURE OF SUGAR
MARKET AND 52) EFFECTS ON THAI SUGAR EXPORTS 38 (2004).
53) FTA Watch Group, supra note 6.
54) The author calculated from the data of
the Ministry of Commerce, Thailand.
55) Department of Trade Negotiations, supra note 5,
at 4.
56) This Regulation is entitled “Council Regulation
(EC) No. 1260/2001.”
57) Panel Report, European Communities – Export
Subsidies on Sugar, 3.1, WT/DS283/R (Oct. 15, 2004).
58) Id. 3.2.
59) Id. 3.3.
60) Id. 3.5.
61) Id. 3.4.
62) Id. 3.7.
63) Id.
64) See http://www.acpsec.org (last visited Apr. 27,
2006).
65) Panel Report, supra note 57, 3.7.
66) Id. 3.13.
67) Id.
68) Id. 3.14.
69) Thailand has been using this “coalition strategy”
to successfully bring a case against powerful countries. For example,
in United States – Import of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
(1998), Thailand, along with Malaysia, India and Pakistan, fought against
the U.S. regarding a U.S.’s prohibition on the importation of
certain shrimp and shrimp products. In United States – Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (2000), Thailand joined Australia,
Brazil, Chile, the EC, India, Indonesia, Japan and Korea to file the
U.S. dealing with the U.S. Tariff Law. In EC – Chicken Cuts (2005),
Thailand joined Brazil to sue against the EC.
70) Panel Report, supra note 57, 7.1.
71) Id.
72) Id.
73) Id. 7.2.
74) Id.
75) Id.
76) Id. 8.1.
77) Id.
78) Id. 8.3.
79) Id. 8.5.
80) Appellate Body Report, European Communities –
Export Subsidies on Sugar, 162, WT/DS283/AB/R (Apr. 28, 2005).
81) Id. 164.
82) Id. 174.
83) Id.
84) Id.
85) Id.
86) Id. 180 & 186.
87) Id. 193.
88) Id. 197.
89) Id.
90) Id. 206.
91) Id. 224.
92) Id.
93) Id.
94) Id.
95) Id. 230.
96) Id. 243.
97) Id.
98) Id. 247.
99) Id. 248.
100) Id.
101) Id. 250.
102) Id. 253.
103) Id. 254.
104) Id.
105) Id. 269.
106) Id. 257.
107) Id. 266
108) Id. 267.
109) Id. 275.
110) Id. 283.
111) Id. 347.
112) Article 2.3(c) Arbitration Report, European Communities
– Export Subsidies on Sugar, 1, WT/DS283/14 (Oct. 28, 2005).
113) Id. 106.
114) Council Regulation 318/2006, 2006 J.O. (L 58).
115) Id. pmbl. (8) & (9).
116) Id. art. 3.
117) Id. art. 5.
118) Id. art. 7.
119) Id. annex III.
120) Id. art. 8.
121) Id. annex IV.
122) Id. art. 12.
123) See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e.htm
(last visited Apr. 27, 2006).
