There are two major weaknesses of the Act. The first
is that these general propositions on public participation have found
very little, if any, development in the rest of this important statute.
The second weakness is rooted in the wording of the general provisions
on public participation, which may be accorded to individual persons…
but may not. In this respect, the wording of the Act sounds as nothing
more than a general policy statement.
Apart from these major weaknesses there are many other purely legal
defects, which can be seen for example in the rules on the disclosure
of information. The right to obtain information is more efficiently
expressed in the Constitution of Thailand, (Section 58 which was quoted
above) and the Statute on the Public Information adopted in 1997. What
is needed, however, is a mechanism and clear conditions under which
the secrets pertaining to national security or trade and business must
be disclosed to the environmental authorities. Only in Section 19 of
the Act is it mentioned that the National Environmental Board, the supreme
body of Thailand in determining environmental policy and setting environmental
standards, may request such a disclosure. No procedural safeguards are
set. The weakness of the national Environmental Board does not lie only
in the lack of procedural clarity and transparency. It is unlikely to
be an efficient body, since its 14 members are Prime Minister and other
leading ministers of the Cabinet. These members would hardly have enough
time to go into complicated details of the environmental issues. A half-quorum
is required in order for any proceedings to take place. Apart from the
Secretary of the Board it would be difficult to ensure that leading
members in Thai politics would have the time to attend the Environmental
Board meetings. There is a provision that the Board may draw members
from the public - not more than eight, but probably less(12).
The presence of few people from the public sector in the highest environmental
body is a good beginning. The Board itself has wide, but not specifically
defined, powers(13). Apart from elaborating on environmental
policy and setting environmental standards, the Board has the function
of supervising the application of environmental law by governmental
agencies. It is clear, however, that it does not have any judicial or
quasi-judicial powers. If any maladministration is found, the Board
can only address the issue to the Prime Minister, who is apparently
also the chairman. It seems the Board does not have an independent political
standing.
