In the case of parallel imports, developing countries may possibly expect the less intimidating action under trade sanction section 301 from the U.S. for the following reasons. First, developing countries that are TRIPs member are free to allow parallel imports by applying an international exhaustion doctrine. Second, compared to compulsory licensing, there is less government involvement in parallel imports because there is no need of government approval of the importation. Third, unlike compulsory licensing, under parallel importation the owners of IPRs receive a benefit from the first sale of their products at price they set. It seems that the owners of IPRs are more voluntary in parallel imports than compulsory licensing. Finally, the U.S. also allows parallel imports of parallel imports of pharmaceutical products from Canada and Mexico(36) as a result of the U.S. consumer pressure and governmental health care policy(37). Therefore, it is improper for the U.S. to force other countries to restrict parallel imports, if the U.S. itself allows gray market pharmaceuticals.

Therefore, the following section will explain and analyze the controversial disagreements between the U.S. and developing countries by selecting some actual cases taking place in Thailand, Brazil, India, and South Africa. The situations of these developing countries will illustrate the adverse effects of the U.S. pressure on developing countries, such as a high price of medicines and a delay in the issuance of compulsory licensing. Moreover, due to difficulties on compulsory licensing, parallel imports may be considered a proper solution for increasing access to drugs rather than compulsory licensing.

1. Thailand
Thailand has faced with the AIDS panderhic because most HIV infected patients cannot afford the antiretroviral drug(38). In order to reduce the price of HIV drugs, the Thai Government has attempted to grant limited patent protection rights and support an active generic industry(39). The Thai Government has tried to grant compulsory licensing for essential drugs, which is consistent with the text of TRIPs Agreement.

Unfortunately, the U.S. has opposed such action, for example, the Thai Government attempted to grant a compulsory licensing for the drug didanosine (ddl), owned by Bristol-Myers-Squibb (U.S. multinational pharmaceutical company). In return, the U.S. imposed a strong trade pressure in order to, prevent the issuance of the compulsory license. Finally on January 16, 2000, the Thai government involuntarily rejected the issuance of the ddl compulsory license because of the U.S. trade pressures(40).

Needless to say, the threats of the U.S. Government and pharmaceutical companies has caused hesitation and delay by the Thai Government in issuing compulsory licenses and has impeded access to HIV/AIDS drugs in Thailand. Nevertheless, the current Thai Patent Act, adopting an international exhaustion doctrine, allows parallel imports that may solve the issue of obtaining access to essential drugs and diminish the adverse effect of U.S. pressure on Thailand.

2. Brazil
Like Thailand, Brazil also faced a HIV/AIDS crisis. However, the Government of Brazil has successfully launched many programs to help AIDS patients in terms of prices and access to drugs(41) Regardless of the U.S. pressure, the Brazil Government has used both a compulsory licensing and parallel imports strategies(42). In other words, the Government is brave enough to step forward to protect its own people against the U.S. Government and pharmaceutical companies by playing an important role to support the accessibility of drugs and technology transfer in the pharmaceutical industry.

In order to improve access to drugs with affordable price and encourage the transfer of technology, the Brazil patent law provides patents for pharmaceuticals, but subject to a working requirement. As a result of a "working requirement" under Article 68, it permits the issuance of compulsory licenses in case where patent holders choose to supply the market through imports rather than local production. The Government put pressure on multinational pharmaceutical companies to produce patented drugs in Brazil instead of importing the drugs into Brazil.

As the result of powerful global pressures and a change in U.S. policy under the Bush Administration, the U.S. announced on June 25, 2001 that it would withdraw the case against Brazil in a joint statement with Brazil(45). The U.S. and Brazil have set up the U.S.-Brazil Consultative Mechanism to find mutually agreeable "creative solutions."(46) In return for the U.S. withdrawing the case, Brazil agreed to consult with the U.S. prior to issuing a compulsory license for patents held by U.S. companies, based on a case-by-case decision(47). The U.S. action of withdrawing the case was joyfully acclaimed by developing and least-developed countries and NGOs(48). This event not only demonstrated a pleasant compromising solution between a developing and developed country, but also mitigated other confrontations between the U.S. and other developing counties who opposed the U.S. position, particularly South Africa.

Due to a strong political commitment by Brazil to solve the HIV/AIDS crisis without fear of U.S. pressure, Brazil is one developing country that has successfully achieved improved accessibility to affordable AIDS drugs. Brazil's achievement provides a good example for other developing countries to solve AIDS issues by following Brazil's footstep. In addition, by obtaining an adequate amount of manufacturing capacity, Brazil also assists other developing countries to increase manufacturing capacity through a transfer of technology(49).

3. India
Similar to other developing countries, India was threatened by U.S. trade sanction with support of PhRMA for inadequate patent protection for pharmaceuticals(50). The U.S. pharmaceutical companies claim that the India Patents Act of 1970 essentially provided no patent protection for pharmaceuticals. The drug companies asserted that (1) the term of patent protection was too short to provide protection and the examination and opposition procedure caused too much delay and decreased the available duration of protection; (2) the royalty for compulsory licenses was artificially low; and (3) product patents were not available for pharmaceuticals(51). However, India has an obligation to amend its patent law to provide the patent product for pharmaceuticals by 2005(52). Like Brazil, the Indian Patent Act of 1970 states that importation of a patented product is not equivalent to a working patent in India(53). Multinational pharmaceutical companies argue that this working requirement is not consistent with the TRIPs Agreement.

The Patent Act of 1970 has produced considerable advantages for the Indian pharmaceutical industry by producing inexpensive drugs for the market, and maintaining the trade balance in the pharmaceutical sector(54). Although India is classified as a developing country, India has a successful pharmaceutical industry with innovative capacities of drug development(55). Pharmaceutical prices in India are considered among the lowest price in the world. India has become a source of parallel imports to other developing and least-developed countries, providing low price drugs for poor populations(56)." However, India has enacted legislation granting patent protection, effective 2005. In other words, this favorable factor of a weak patent protection will no longer continue to exist in the near future (2005) as a result of the TRIPs Agreement. This change will affect the Indian pharmaceutical by increasing drug prices, which may make India's drugs unaffordable and inaccessible for the poor(57). Nevertheless, the strong support by Indian Government, the innovative capacitates in pharmaceutical industry, and the long-term benefits of a weak patent protection should facilitate the Indian pharmaceutical industries to continually maintain their competitive position in global market in terms of low price and more availability. That would benefit all poor patients not only in India but also in other developing and least-developed countries by improving access to essential drugs, particularly HIV drugs.

4. South Africa
South Africa has experienced the highest increase of HIV in the world, with 2.4 million people infected, or 6.3% of the population. Due to the high prices of HIV drugs, the South Africa Government has attempted to reduce the cost of medicines and increase access to HIV drug(58). The government passed the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997 to improve access to essential drugs. The 1997 Amendment permits both the development of generic AIDS drugs under compulsory licensing and the parallel importation of low-priced AIDS drugs into South Africa(59). Allowing parallel imports has definitely given poor HIV patients increased access to drugs in terms of low price and more availability. With inadequate capability for pharmaceutical manufacturing(60), it is difficult for South Africa to produce patented drugs in South Africa under compulsory licensing. Thus, parallel imports are a more useful means to gain access to affordable HIV drugs than compulsory licensing in South Africa(61).

Responding to the 1997 Amendment, both the U.S. Government and pharmaceutical companies strongly opposed South Africa's efforts to undertake compulsory licensing or parallel imports to make HIV/ADDS drugs or other essential medicines more available and affordable to its people(62). The U.S. had withheld certain trade benefits from South Africa and had threatened trade sanctions by placing South Africa on the Special 301 Watch List(63). The issue became increasingly debated because of a South Africa court case, with the South Africa government against the 39 largest pharmaceutical companies in the world(64). They took South Africa to a court by claiming that South Africa's 1997 Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act section 15C, allowing a compulsory licensing and parallel imports, violated the TRIPS Agreement(65).

The three-year court case ended on April 23, 2001. The South Africa government agreed to abide with TRIPS obligation and to set up a joint working committee with the pharmaceutical companies to draw up regulations governing the 1997 Medicines Act(66). In return, the pharmaceutical companies agreed to supply drugs to South Africa at drastically reduced prices to help poor patients(67). The U.S. government recently acknowledged the importance of providing affordable AIDS drugs in South Africa(68) and subsequently lessened its pressure on South Africa, which should be a good sign for other developing countries.

V. The Support From WTO Doha Ministerial Conference

In November 2001, the WTO Ministerial Conference met in Doha in Qatar. Compared to the 1999 WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle, developing countries participated more equally in the Doha Conference(69). The outcome of the Doha Ministerial Conference was important in terms of public health, as presented in the Doha Ministerial Declaration and the specific Declaration on Public Health(70). In fact, the Doha declarations were successfully achieved because of the strong participation of developing and least-developed countries with the support of developed counties(71). The U.S. has changed its domestic and foreign policy in an area of public health. The U.S. foreign policy has become more liberal regarding the utilization of compulsory licensing and parallel imports(72). Its domestic policy also changed from prohibiting parallel imports to allowing parallel imports in to the U.S. of pharmaceuticals that ,meet the U.S. standard in order to reduce the domestic drug price(73). Moreover, the Bush Administration has indicated concern about the HIV/AIDS crisis, and the individuals, families and communities affected by the disease(74).

Part  3

(34) See Weissman, Aids and Developing Countries, supra note 18, at 2; and also see The Associated Press, Brazil is Planning to Request License for AIDS Viracept, June 27, 2001, available at http://www.aegis.com/news/ap/2001/AP010688.html (visited on Oct. 7, 2002). (commenting that Brazil continued to issue compulsory licenses for an AIDS drug due to the high price of the AIDS drug. The U.S. filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization over Brazil law; however, this case was dropped under immense international pressure.).
(35) See Myles Getlan, Comment, TRIPS and the Future of Section 301: A Comparative Study in Trade Dispute Resolution, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 173, 173 (1995). (pointing out that that improving IPRs protection in other countries by the section 301 approach has failed and suggest that the most effective way to strengthen intellectual property protection abroad should be to improve the GATT dispute resolution process.); and also see Adam Smith, A High Price to Pay: The Costs of the U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Need for Process Oriented Reform, 4 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 325, 325-46 (1999). (suggesting that the U.S. should limit its use of trade sanction as an instrument of foreign policy because the trade sanctions can harm the U.S.'s short-term and long-term economic interest.).
(36) See The Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000 (MEDSA) H.R. Rep. No. 106-948, at 38 (2000). MEDSA was passed as section 745 of Public Law 106-387.; see William Davis, Comment, The Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000: Releasing Gray Market Pharmaceuticals, 9 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 483 (2001) (pointing out that the MEDSA was a piecemeal compromise aimed at lowering pharmaceutical prices by allowing wholesalers and pharmacists to buy U.S. approved drugs abroad and resell them in the United States. Before issuing the MEDSA, the United States expressly banned the resale or parallel imports of foreign-purchased pharmaceuticals under the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987.); see Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-293, 21 U.S.C. 381(d) (2000); see JOHN F. CALFEE, PRICE. MARKETS AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL REVOLUTION 1-3 (2000); and also see infra note 777.
(37) See Melody Petersen, Drug-Cost Bill May Not Dent Industry Profit, N.Y. TIMES. Sept. 28, 2000. at Cl.; and also see Robert Pear, FOr Price Break on Drugs. Congress Looks to Canada. , N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, at 22.
(38) See Judy Rein, Article, International Governance through Trade Agreements: Patent Protection for Essential Medicines, 21 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 379, 402 (2001), cited in Global Trade and Access to Medicine: AIDS Treatments in Thailand, 354 Lancet 1893, 1984 Nov. 27, 1999. (the cost of triple therapy is USD 675 per month, while the average monthly salary of an office worker is only USD 120. The high price certainly reduces access to HIV drugs because HIV infected patients cannot afford to the price of therapy.)
(39) For example, Thailand Government Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO) has been producing generic AZT for a quarter of the price of the brand name version for several years. See Sutin Wannabovom, Thais Protest U.S. Firm's AIDS Drug Monopoly, available at http://biz.yahoo.com/rf/991222/bg/html (visited Oct. 28, 2002)
(40) See Thailand: Government Rejects Compulsory Licensing for ddl, Kaiser Daily HIV/AIDS Report, Thursday, Jan. 20, 2000, available at http.//report.kff.org/achive/aids/2000/01/kh00120.3,htm (visited Oct. 28, 2002).; Thailand : U.S. and 'Gig Pharma' Orchestrate Pressure, Access to Essential Medicines Report, Jan. 11, 2001, available at http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm? articleid-CACADFAI-C511-43ED-ADE7... (visited Oct. 28. 2002); and also see The Letter from James Love, Consumer Project on Technology, available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/Thailand/tmr-jan22-2000.html. (visited Oct. 28, 2002).; To increase access to drugs besides a compulsory license, Thailand allows parallel imports of drugs from other countries in Asia. The U.S. pharmaceutical companies have argued strongly against Thailand allowing parallel imports. The information is available at www.phrma.org/issues/int/thailand.html (visited Oct. 28, 2002)
(41) See Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 1.; and also see Brazil Fights for Affordable Drugs Against HIV/AIDS, Rev Panam Salud Publica/Pan Am J Public Health 9(5), 2001, at 332-33, available at http://www.paho.org/English/DBI/ES/v9n5-TEMA-Brazil.pdf. (visited Oct. 16. 2002). [hereinafter Brazil Fights for Affordable Drugs] (explaining that Brazil's policy of providing patient with free antiretroviral (ARV) drugs has played a significant role in the country's achievements. A key to the broad public access to ARVs has been the local manufacturing of cheaper generic equivalents of the medicines developed and patented in wealthier countries. By 1999 this approach had cut treatment costs in Brazil by 70%.)
(42) See Article 68 and 71 of Brazil patent law (compulsory licenses), translated into English by the World Intellectual Property Organization, available at http://www.cotech.org/ip/health/cl/brazil1.html. (visited Oct 18. 2002)
(43) See Brazil Fights for Affordable Drugs, supra note 41, at 334-36.; and also see Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO-TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the US.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT'L L.365, 367 (2002). (pointing out that local working requirement is generally permissible based on the broad reading of a whole context of TRIPs)
(44) See Ellen 't Hoen, Article, Public Health and International Law : TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way From Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 33 (2002).; and also see Brazil Fights for Affordable Drugs, supra note 41, at 336.
(45) See Helen Cooper, U.S. Drops WTO Complaint Against Brazilian Patent Law, Wall St J. Eur A2 (June 26, 2001).; and also see USTR Press Release, United States and Brazil Agree to Use Newly Created Consultative Mechanism to Promote Cooperation on HIV/AIDS and Address WTO Patent Dispute, June 25, 2001, available at http://www.ustr.gov/release/2001/06/01-46.htm (visited Oct. 18, 2002).
(46) Id.
(47) See Chakravarthi Raghavan, US. Beats a (Tactical) Retreat over Brazil's Patent Iaw, available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/tactical.htm. (visited on Oct. 16, 2002).
(48) See Id. The NGOs welcomed the US action such as Elen 't Hoen of Medicins sans Fortier (MSF), Oxfam, and Jame Love of the US Consumer Project on Technology.
(49) See Hoen, supra note 44, at 33.
(50) See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufactures of America, PhRMA Special 301 Submission Priority Foreign Countries, 8 (2001), available at http://www.phrma.org/intnat/all.phtml?prefix=reg. (visited on Dec. 2. 2001)
(51) See Shodeep Baneriji, The Indian Intellectual Property Rights Regime and the TRIPS Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EMERGING MARKETS (Clarisa Long, ed.) at 58-59.; and see ASEAN Workshop on TRIPs and Pharmaceuticals, supra note 10, at 7.
(52) See Suresh Koshy, The Effect of TRIPS on Indian Patent Law: A Pharmaceutical Industry Perspective, 1 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 4, 9-10 (1995); and also see Carsten Fink, How Strong Patent Protection in India Might Affect the Behavior or Mansnational Pharmaceutical Industries, Development Research Group, The World Bank, at 3.
(53) See Baneriji, supra note 51, at 67-68, and 80. (explaining that section 83(a) states "patents are granted to encourage inventions and to secure that the inventions are worked in India on a commercial scale" and section 33(b) provides "they are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for the importation of the patented article.")
(54) See Koshy, supra note 52, at para.23.
(55) See Carlos M. Correa, Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, June 2002, WHO/EDM/PAR/2002.3, (Health Economics and Drugs EDM Series No.12, WHO) at Annex 2 Table of Levels of Development of Pharmaceutical Industry, by Country (Source : Balance R, Pogany J, Forstner H. The World's Pharmaceutical Industry. An International Perspective on Innovation, Competition and Policy. Vienna, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 1992) [hereinafter Correa, Implications of Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health]
(56) See Shubha Ghosh, Pills. Patents, and Power. State Creation of Gray Markets as a Limit on Patent Rights, 53 FLA. L. REV. 789, 814 (2001). (pointing out that the main source of the parallel imports in South Africa is from India, which until recently did not recognize patents on medicine.)
(57) Id. 82-86.; see Jayashree Watal, Introducing Product Patents in the Indian Pharmaceutical Sector: Implications for Prices and Welfare, 20 World Competition: Review of Law and Economic,l, 5-21(1996).; and also see Watal, supra note 5, at 733-52. (pointing out that if the patent protection raised the drug price in India, India might take advantage of cheaper drugs from Bangladesh.)
(58) See David Benjamin Snyder, Comment, South Africa's Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act A Spoonful of Sugar or a Bitter Pill to Swallow?, 18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 175 (1999).
(59) Id. at 180-4. (pointing out that allowing parallel imports under the exhaustion doctrine have obvious potential benefits for consumers because of the increase in competition created. Section 15(C) (b) clearly permits parallel imports by allowing" people to import a manufacturer's patented pharmaceuticals sold in other countries into South Africa.)
(60) See Correa, Implications of Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, supra note 55, at Annex 2. (stating that South Africa only has the capacities to produce finished products from imported ingredients.)
(61) The main source of the parallel imports is from India, which until recently did not recognize patents on medicine (but has enacted legislation granting patent protection that will be effective in 2005). See Ghosh, supra note 760, at 814.
(62) See Weissman, Aids and Developing Countries, supra note 18, at 2.; and also see The Associated Press. Brazil is Planning to Request License for AIDS V racept, June 27, 2001, available at http://www.aegis.com/news/ap/2001/AP010688.htm1. (visited Oct. 7, 2002). (explaining that Brazil continued to consider issuing a compulsory licenses for an AIDS drug. The U.S. had filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization over Brazil law; however, this case was dropped under immense international pressure.)
(63) Press Release, Office of the U.S. Made Representative, U.S.T.R. Announces Results of Special 301 Annual Review (Apr. 30, 1999), available at http://www.ustr.gov/release/1999/04/99-41.html. (visited May 14, 2002).
(64) See Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and 41 others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and 9 Others, The High Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division) Case No. 4183/98. (field Feb 18, 1998)
(65) Id.; and see South Africa Medicines and Related Substances Control Act No. 101 of 1965, Amendment No. 70, Section 15 (C) (1997), available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/pharm-plicy/2001-January/000607.html.; see Duane Nash, Berkeley Technology Law Journal Annual Review of Law and Technology: VI Foreign & International Law South Africa's Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 485 (2000).; see Winston P. Nagan, International Intellectual Property, Access to Health Care, and Human Rights: South Africa v. United States, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 155 (2002) (pointing out that both compulsory licensing and parallel import schemes are permissible under the TRIPs Agreement.); and also see Frederick M. Abbott, II Discontinuities in the Intellectual Property Regime : The TRIPS-Legality of Measures liken to Address Public Health Crisis : A Synopsis, 7 WID. L. SYMP. J. 71, 82-84 (2001). [hereinafter, Abbott, TRIPS and Public Health Crisis] (noting that section 15 (C) is not overbroad or ambiguous and entirely consistent with the acceptance for authorizing international exhaustion and parallel imports.)
(66) See Steven Lee Myers, South Africa and U.S. End Dispute Over Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1999, at A8.
(67) See HIV and AIDS Drugs in Africa, available at http://www.avert.org/aidsdrugsafrica.htm (visited on Oct. 16, 2002).
(68) See Vice President Gore's June 25, 1999 Letter to James E. Clybum, Endorsing the Use of Compulsory Licensing and Parallel Imports of Pharmaceutical Drugs in South Africa, available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/vp-feb-25-99.htm1. (visited Sept. 27, 2002).; On July 26, 1999, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) met with the U.S. representatives to discuss the use of compulsory licensing and parallel imports to make HIV/AIDS drugs available at affordable prices in South Africa. This information is available at http://www.hri.ca/partners/alp/press/gore-press.shtml. (visited Sept. 27, 2002).
(69) See Peter Lichtenbaum, Article, Reflections on The WTO Doha Ministerial: "Special Teatment" vs. "Equal Participation:" Striking A Balance in The Doha Negotiations, 17 AM. U. INT’L L.REV. 1003, 1021 (2002).; and also see Peter M. Gerhart, Article, Reflections on The WTO Doha Ministerial : Slow Transformations : The WTO As A Distributive Organization, 17 AM. U. INT'L L.REV. 1045, 1090-92 and 1094 (2002).
(70) See Doha Ministerial Declaration (Nov. 14, 2001), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1, available at http://www.wto.org/english/ thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e.htm. [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration]; and also see Declaration on The TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindeci_tripe_e.htm. [hereinafter Doha TRIPs and Public Health Declaration]
(71) During the draft of Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, there are three proposals from (1) a group of developed countries (the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, and Switzerland); (2) a group of developing countries (the Africa Group and 19 countries); and (3) the EU. Those text drafts are respectively available at http://www.wto.org/ english/tratop_e/trips_e/mindecdraft_w313_e.htm; http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/paper_develop_w296_e.htm; and http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/paper_eu_w280_e.htm. (visited Oct. 8, 2002); see TRIPs and Public Health vs TRIPs and Pandemics?, BRIDGES Monthly Vol. 5, No. 7 Sept. 2001, available at http://www ictsd.org/ministerial/doha/bridgesmonthly5-7.htm (visited Oct. 18, 2002).
(72) See Exec. Order No 13, 155, 65 Fed Reg 30, 521 (2000); and also see Hoen, supra note 748, at 34-35.; see A Press Release from the Office of the USTR, dated Sept. 17, 1999, available at http://www.ustr.gov/release/1999/09/00-76.html (reporting that the U.S. promised to drop threats of trade sanction against South Africa); and also see John A. Harrelson, IV Note : TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and The HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, 7 WID. L. SYMP. J. 175 (2001).
(73) Before issuing the Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000(MEDSA), the United States expressly banned the resale or parallel imports of foreign-purchased pharmaceuticals under the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987. The MEDSA was a piecemeal compromise aimed at lowering pharmaceutical prices by allowing wholesalers and pharmacists to buy U.S. approved drugs abroad and resell them in the United States, passing the discounted foreign prices along to the consumer. See Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-293. See 21 U.S.C. 381(d) (2000) [hereinafter called PDMA]; see Davis, supra note 739, at 483. (pointing out that there is an opportunity for arbitrage in the pharmaceutical industry among the U.S. foreign neighbors.); and also see H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-948m at 39 (2001)
(74) See USTR Press Release, United States and Brazil Agree to Use Newly Created Consultative Mechanism to Promote Cooperation on HIV/AIDS and Address wTO Patent Dispute, June 25, 2001, available at http://www.ustr.gov/release/2001/06/01-46.htm (visited Oct. 18, 2002).