No doubt, the lack of generic competition and government control on prices provide ample opportunity for drug suppliers to set excessive prices; being the main factors for the high prices of medicines. Any attempt to tackle this problem has to be mindful of these factors.

Unlike other goods, identical medicinal products are usually quoted at different prices in different markets. The price differentials mainly stem from the pricing policy of drug multinationals that typically charge "whatever price the market can bear". The price level of medicines generally depends on the situation in the market.46 Patents seem to be the most important factor for determining drug prices. Before TRIPS was adopted as part of the WTO agreements, it was evident that countries with no pharmaceutical product patents, whether developed or developing countries, showed lower price levels than countries that provided a high degree of patent protection. Moreover, in countries with no patents on medicinal products and also price control measures, such as India and Italy, the price levels of pharmaceuticals were very low.47

The figures show high price variations in the Thai pharmaceutical market. Identical products are generally sold by different companies at disparate prices.48 The price margins for each drug are relatively wide, ranging from 93.55 to 1,966.67 per cent. Drugs sold by Thai-owned companies are generally much cheaper than those offered by TNCs. For example, Pfizer's Fluconazole (200mg caps) is sold under the brand name of "Diflucan" at US $6.20--much more expensive than that sold by GPO at US$0.30. Table 5 also reveals price differentiation of various anti-retroviral medicines in Thailand. This confirms that the prices of branded drugs are quoted several times higher than those of the generics.

TABLE 5 comparison of anti-retroviral prices in Thailand, January 2005          
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARV                         Patent status   Originator         Generic          
                             in Thailand      (baht/units)       (baht/units)  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1st line ARVs                                                                  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zidovudine (AZT) (100mg)    Non-patent      4644/100 (GSK)     600/100 (GPO)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lamivudine (3TC) (150mg)    Non-patent      6046/60 (GSK)      600/60 (GPO)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevirapine (NVP) (200mg)    Non-patent      1659/60 (BI)       900/60 (GPO)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Efavirenz (EFV) (200mg)     Patented        3192/100 (Merck)   1292/100 (Cipla)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stavudine (d4T) (40mg)      Non-patent      5660/60 (BMS)      270/60 (GPO)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2nd line ARVs                                                                  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tenofovir (TDF) (300mg)     Unconfirmed     3131/100 (Gilead)  N/A              
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Didanosine (ddI) (250mg or  Patented        7384/60 (BMS)      1380/60 (GPO)    
  125x2mg)                                                                      
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abacavir (ABC) (300mg)      Non-patent      4617/100 (GSK)     3040/100 (Cipla)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ritonavir (RTV) (100mg)     Non-patent      418/100 (Abbott)   1022/100        
                                                                 (Hetero)      
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lopinavir (LPV)             Patented        N/A                N/A              
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Saquinavir (SQV) (200mg)    Unconfirmed     5515/180 (Roche)   1900/180        
                                                                 (Hetero)      
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lopinavir (LPV)/Ritonavir   Patented        17762/180          5930/180        
  (RTV) (113.3+33.3mg)                        (Abbott)           (Hetero)      
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Department of Intellectual Property; Ministry of Public Health; MSF:   Untangling the Web of Price Reductions: A Pricing Guide for the Purchase of  ARVs for Developing Countries, June 2005                                      

Three factors are responsible for the price differences. First, the original companies often sell their products under brand names, while GPO offers its products under generic names instead. This enables GPO's drugs to remain the lowest-priced products in the market. Secondly, the cost of heavy promotion is normally included in the prices charged for the products sold. This causes prices of branded drugs with intense promotional campaigns to be higher than that of GPO. GPO basically operates as a non-profit-making organisation, choosing not to spend its financial resources to attract customers and create positive associations with the brand. Thirdly, local companies and GPO could maintain low prices because they were free to import cheap raw materials and active ingredients from many alternative sources. These particularly include countries whose patent legislation was not stringent (such as India).49 By contrast, subsidiaries of multinationals or joint ventures procure raw materials from their overseas affiliates. The prices of intra-group sales of raw materials are generally set in accordance with the standard accounting policy relating to transfer pricing. This leads to over-invoicing of imports and high prices for finished products sold by the foreign firms.

In Thailand, apart from customs and tariffs law, there is no specific legislation regarding arm's length price or other mechanisms dealing with the transfer pricing practices of TNCs.50 As a result, the transfer pricing techniques have been widely utilised by foreign companies operating in Thailand. A study on pharmaceutical prices indicates that prices of sales by parent companies to subsidiaries located in Thailand are often artificially raised and usually higher than prices charged between other unrelated parties. For example, in 1981 the prices of imported aspirin, dexamethasone and ampicillin paid by subsidiaries of multinationals to their parent or overseas affiliates were respectively 23, 15 and 5 per cent higher than the prices of the same drugs charged between independent enterprises.51 The lack of any specific legislation to check transfer pricing renders the pharmaceutical market in Thailand vulnerable to foreign price distortions. Prices of drugs can therefore be artificially inflated or deflated by pharmaceutical firms depending on what they feel about the market.


Footnotes

46. A multiple-country analysis based on price packages of medicines conducted by Schut and Van Bergeijk shows that the main factors that cause price differentials in the pharmaceutical industry are: (i) per capita gross domestic product (GDP), (ii) government policies on price controls, and (iii) patent protection for pharmaceutical products. F.T. Schut and P.A.G. Van Bergeijk, "International Price Discrimination: the Pharmaceutical Industry", World Development, Vol.14, No.9, 1986, pp.1141-1150.

47. ibid., pp.1146-1147.

48. W. Hiranrath et al., "The Survey of Selling Prices of TNCs and Local GMP Manufacturers", Chulalongkorn University Press, Bangkok, 1990, pp.43-44.

49. However, the situation might change after 2005 when all WTO Members (except least developed countries) have to protect pharmaceutical patents as required by the TRIPS Agreement. The supply of cheap raw materials and active ingredients might be limited as a result. See S.M. Karandikar, Indian Drug Industry after GATT (World Trade Centre, Bombay, 1994).

50. N. Chaiseri and C. Hongladarom (eds), "The Role of Multinational Corporations in Thailand", Conference at Thammasat University, Bangkok, 1984, p.175.

51. M. Kaosa-ad, "Transfer Pricing in the Pharmaceutical Industry", Thammasat Economic Journal, Vol.3, No.1, 1985, p.15.

 
* This article is published with the kind permission of Jakkrit Kuanpoth, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong, Australia. This article originally appeared in Intellectual Property Quarterly, No.2, 2007, pp.186-215.
 

 

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